We present the first cryptographically sound security proof of the well-known Otway-Rees protocol. More precisely, we show that the protocol is secure against arbitrary active attacks including concurrent protocol runs if it is implemented using provably secure cryptographic primitives. We prove secrecy of the exchanged keys with respect to the accepted cryptographic definition of real-or-random secrecy, i.e., indistinguishability of exchanged keys and random ones, given the view of a general cryptographic attacker. Although we achieve security under cryptographic definitions, our proof is performed in a deterministic setting corresponding to a slightly extended Dolev-Yao model; in particular, it does not have to deal with probabilistic aspects of cryptography and is hence in the scope of current proof tools. The reason is that we exploit a recently proposed ideal cryptographic library, which has a provably secure cryptographic implementation, as well as recent results on linking symbolic and cryptographic key secrecy. Besides establishing the cryptographic security of the Otway-Rees protocol, our result also exemplifies the potential of this cryptographic library and the recent secrecy preservation theorem for symbolic yet cryptographically sound proofs of security.
Introduction
Many practically relevant cryptographic protocols like SSL/TLS, S/MIME, IPSec, or SET use cryptographic primitives like signature schemes or encryption in a black-box way, while adding many non-cryptographic features. Vulnerabilities have accompanied the design of such protocols ever since early authentication protocols like Needham-Schroeder [38, 20] , over carefully designed de-facto standards like SSL and PKCS [44, 17] , up to current widely deployed products like Microsoft Passport [22] . However, proving the security of such protocols has been a very unsatisfactory task for a long time.
One way to conduct such proofs is the cryptographic approach, whose security definitions are based on complexity theory, e.g., [24, 23, 25, 14] . The security of a cryptographic protocol is proved by reduction, i.e., by showing that breaking the protocol implies breaking one of the underlying cryptographic primitives with respect to its cryptographic definition. This approach captures a very comprehensive adversary model and allows for mathematically rigorous and precise proofs.
However, because of probabilism and complexity-theoretic restrictions, these proofs have to be done by hand so far, which yields proofs with faults and imperfections. Moreover, such proofs rapidly become too complex for larger protocols.
The alternative is the formal-methods approach, which is concerned with the automation of proofs using model checkers and theorem provers. As these tools currently cannot deal with cryptographic details like error probabilities and computational restrictions, abstractions of cryptography are used. They are almost always based on the so-called Dolev-Yao model [21] . This model simplifies proofs of larger protocols considerably and gave rise to a large body of literature on analyzing the security of protocols using various techniques for formal verification, e.g., [35, 33, 29, 18, 41, 1] .
Among the protocols typically analyzed in the Dolev-Yao model, the Otway-Rees protocol [39] , which aims at establishing a shared key between two users by means of a trusted third party, stands out as one of the most prominent protocols. It has been extensively studied in the past, e.g., in [40, 28, 41] , and various new approaches and formal proof tools for the analysis of security protocols were validated by showing that they can prove the protocol in the Dolev-Yao model (respectively that they can find the well-known type-flaw attack if the underlying model does not provide sufficient typing itself; the model that our proof is based upon excludes this attack). However, all existing proofs of security of the Otway-Rees protocol are restricted to the Dolev-Yao model, i.e., no theorem exists which allows for carrying over the results of an existing proof to the cryptographic approach with its much more comprehensive adversary. Thus, despite the tremendous amount of research dedicated to the Otway-Rees protocol, it is still an open question whether an actual implementation based on provably secure cryptographic primitives is secure under cryptographic security definitions. We close this gap by providing the first security proof of the Otway-Rees protocol in the cryptographic approach. We show that the protocol is secure against arbitrary active attacks if the Dolev-Yao-based abstraction of symmetric encryption is implemented using a symmetric encryption scheme that is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks and that additionally ensures integrity of ciphertexts. More precisely, we prove real-or-random secrecy of the exchanged keys, i.e., we show that no cryptographic attacker is able to distinguish fresh, random keys and keys that are actually exchanged between two honest participants unless the underlying cryptography can be broken. This is the accepted cryptographic definition of key secrecy. Moreover, we show consistency of the protocol in that parties that have successfully established a shared key have a consistent view of who the peers of the sessions are.
2 Chosen-ciphertext security and integrity of ciphertexts are the standard security definition of authenticated symmetric encryption schemes [16, 15] , and efficient symmetric encryptions schemes provably secure in this sense exist under reasonable assumptions [15, 43] .
Obviously, establishing a proof in the cryptographic approach presupposes dealing with the mentioned cryptographic details, hence one naturally assumes that our proof heavily relies on complexity theory and is far out of scope of current proof tools. However, our proof is not performed from scratch in the cryptographic setting, but based on a recently proposed cryptographic library [10, 11, 8] , which provides cryptographically faithful, deterministic abstractions of cryptographic primitives, i.e., the abstractions can be securely implemented using actual cryptography. Moreover, the library allows for nesting the abstractions in an arbitrary way, quite similar to the original Dolev-Yao model. While this was shown for public-key encryption and digital signatures in [10] and subsequently extended with message authentication codes in [11] , the most recent extension of the library further incorporated symmetric encryption [8] which constitutes the most commonly used cryptographic primitive in the typical proofs with Dolev-Yao models, and also serves as the central primitive for expressing and analyzing the Otway-Rees protocol. However, as shown in [8] , there are intrinsic difficulties in providing a sound abstraction from symmetric encryption in the strong sense of security used in [10] . Very roughly, a sound Dolev-Yao-style abstraction of symmetric encryption can only be established if a so-called commitment problem does not occur, which means that whenever a key that is not known to the adversary is used for encryption by an honest user then this key will never be revealed to the adversary. We will elaborate on the origin of this problem in more detail in the paper. While [8] discusses several solutions to this problem, the one actually taken is to leave it to the surrounding protocol to guarantee that the commitment problem does not occur, i.e., if a protocol that uses symmetric encryption should be faithfully analyzed, it additionally has to be shown that the protocol guarantees that keys are no longer sent in a form that might make them known to the adversary once an honest participant has started using them. Our proof shows that this is a manageable task that can easily be incorporated in the overall security proof without imposing a major additional burden on the prover.
Once we have shown that the Otway-Rees protocol does not raise the commitment problem, we prove the security of the Otway-Rees protocol based on the deterministic abstraction. In combination with a recent result on linking symbolic and cryptographic key secrecy [9] , this allows us to perform a symbolic proof of secrecy for the Otway-Rees protocol and to derive the desired cryptographic key secrecy from that. Similarly, we establish the consistency property based on the abstraction and exploit a general integrity preservation theorem [6] to derive the consistency property for the cryptographic setting. As the proof is deterministic and rigorous, it should be easily expressible in formal proof tools, in particular theorem provers. Even done by hand, our proof is much less prone to error than a reduction proof conducted from scratch in the cryptographic approach. We also want to point out that our result not only provides the up-to-now missing cryptographic security proof of the Otway-Rees protocol, but also exemplifies the usefulness of the cryptographic library [10] , their extensions [11, 8] , and the corresponding general theorems for linking symbolic and cryptographic properties based on this library [6, 9] for the cryptographically sound verification of cryptographic protocols.
Further Related Work.
Cryptographic underpinnings of a Dolev-Yao model were first addressed by Abadi and Rogaway in [3] . However, they only handled passive adversaries and symmetric encryption. The protocol language and security properties handled were extended in [2, 30] , but still only for passive adversaries. This excludes most of the typical ways of attacking protocols, e.g., man-in-themiddle attacks and attacks by reusing a message part in a different place or a concurrent protocol run. A full cryptographic justification for a Dolev-Yao model, i.e., for arbitrary active attacks and within arbitrary surrounding interactive protocols, was first given recently in [10] with extensions in [11, 8] . Based on the specific Dolev-Yao model whose soundness was proven in [10] , the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol was proved in [7] and a variant of the 3KP payment protocol was proved in [5] . Besides the proof that we present in this paper, the proof in [7, 5] are the only Dolev-Yao-style, computationally sound proof that we are aware of. However, they are considerably simpler than the one we present in this work since it only addresses integrity properties whereas our proof additionally establishes confidentiality properties; moreover, the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol and the 3KP protocol do not use symmetric encryption, hence the commitment problem does not occur there which greatly simplifies the proof. Another cryptographically sound proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol was concurrently developed by Warinschi [45] . The proof is conducted from scratch in the cryptographic approach which takes it out of the scope of formal proof tools.
Laud [31] has recently presented a cryptographic underpinning for a Dolev-Yao model of symmetric encryption under active attacks. His work enjoys a direct connection with a formal proof tool, but it is specific to certain confidentiality properties, restricts the surrounding protocols to straight-line programs in a specific language, and does not address a connection to the remaining primitives of the Dolev-Yao model. Herzog et al. [26] and Micciancio and Warinschi [34] have recently also given a cryptographic underpinning under active attacks. Their results are narrower than that in [10] since they are specific for public-key encryption, but consider slightly simpler real implementations; moreover, the former relies on a stronger assumption whereas the latter severely restricts the classes of protocols and protocol properties that can be analyzed using this primitive. Section 6 of [34] further points out several possible extensions of their work which all already exist in the earlier work of [10] . Canetti and Herzog [19] have recently linked ideal functionalities for mutual authentication and key exchange protocols to corresponding representations in a formal language. They apply their techniques to the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol by considering the exchanged nonces as secret keys. Their work is restricted to the mentioned functionalities and in contrast to the cryptographic library [10] hence does not address soundness of Dolev-Yao models in their usual generality. The considered language does not allow loops and offers public-key encryption as the only cryptographic operation. Moreover, their approach to define a mapping between ideal and real traces following the ideas of [34] only captures trace-based properties (i.e., integrity properties); reasoning about secrecy properties additionally requires adhoc and functionality-specific arguments.
Efforts are also under way to formulate syntactic calculi for dealing with probabilism and polynomial-time considerations, in particular [36, 32, 37, 27] and, as a second step, to encode them into proof tools. This approach can not yet handle protocols with any degree of automation. It is complementary to the approach of proving simple deterministic abstractions of cryptography and working with those wherever cryptography is only used in a blackbox way.
Outline.
Section 2 introduces the notation used in the paper and briefly reviews the aforementioned cryptographic library. Section 3 shows how to model the Otway-Rees protocol based on this library as well as how initially shared keys can be represented in the underlying model. Section 4 contains the symbolic and cryptographic security properties of the Otway-Rees protocol. The symbolic property is proven in Section 5, and Section 6 shows how to derive the cryptographic property for the cryptographic implementation of the protocol. Section 7 concludes.
In this section, we give an overview of the ideal cryptographic library of [10, 11, 8] and briefly sketch its provably secure implementation. We start by introducing the notation used in this paper.
Notation
Let ↓ denote an error element available as an addition to the domains and ranges of all functions and algorithms. The list operation is denoted as l := (x 1 , . . . , x j ), and the arguments are unambiguously retrievable as 
Overview of the Ideal and Real Cryptographic Library
The ideal (abstract) cryptographic library of [10, 11, 8] offers its users abstract cryptographic operations, such as commands to encrypt or decrypt a message, to make or test a signature, and to generate a nonce. All these commands have a simple, deterministic semantics. To allow a reactive scenario, this semantics is based on state, e.g., of who already knows which terms; the state is represented as a database. Each entry has a type (e.g., "ciphertext"), and pointers to its arguments (e.g., a key and a message). Further, each entry contains handles for those participants who already know it. A send operation makes an entry known to other participants, i.e., it adds handles to the entry. The ideal cryptographic library does not allow cheating. For instance, if it receives a command to encrypt a message m with a certain key, it simply makes an abstract database entry for the ciphertext. Another user can only ask for decryption of this ciphertext if he has obtained handles to both the ciphertext and the secret key.
To allow for the proof of cryptographic faithfulness, the library is based on a detailed model of asynchronous reactive systems introduced in [42] and represented as a deterministic machine TH H , called trusted host. The parameter H ⊆ {1 . . . , n} denotes the honest participants, where n is a parameter of the library denoting the overall number of participants. Depending on the considered set H, the trusted host offers slightly extended capabilities for the adversary. However, for current purposes, the trusted host can be seen as a slightly modified Dolev-Yao model together with a network and intruder model, similar to "the CSP Dolev-Yao model" or "the inductive-approach Dolev-Yao model".
The real cryptographic library offers its users the same commands as the ideal one, i.e., honest users operate on cryptographic objects via handles. The objects are now real cryptographic keys, ciphertexts, etc., handled by real distributed machines. Sending a term on an insecure channel releases the actual bitstring to the adversary, who can do with it what he likes. The adversary can also insert arbitrary bitstrings on non-authentic channels. The implementation of the commands is based on arbitrary secure encryption and signature systems according to standard cryptographic definitions, with certain additions like type tagging and additional randomizations.
The security proof of [10] states that the real library is at least as secure as the ideal library. This is captured using the notion of reactive simulatability [42, 13] , which states that whatever an adversary can achieve in the real implementation, another adversary can achieve given the ideal library, or otherwise the underlying cryptography can be broken. This is the strongest possible cryptographic relationship between a real and an ideal system. In particular it covers arbitrary active attacks. Moreover, a composition theorem exists in the underlying model [42, 12] , which states that one can securely replace the ideal library in larger systems with the real library, i.e., without destroying the already established simulatability relation.
Detailed Description of the State of the Cryptographic Library
We conclude this section with the rigorous definition of the state of the ideal cryptographic library. A rigorous definition of the commands of the ideal library used for modeling the Otway-Rees protocol as well as local adversary commands that model the slightly extended adversary capabilities can be found in [10, 8] .
The machine TH H has ports in u ? and out u ! for inputs from and outputs to each user u ∈ H and for u = a, denoting the adversary. The notation follows the CSP convention, e.g., the cryptographic library obtains messages at in u ? that have been output at in u !. Besides the number n of users, the ideal cryptographic library is parameterized by a tuple L of length functions which are used to calculate the "length" of an abstract entry, corresponding to the length of the corresponding bitstring in the real implementation. Moreover, L contains bounds on the message lengths and the number of accepted inputs at each port. These bounds can be arbitrarily large, but have to be polynomially bounded in the security parameter.
Using the notation of [10] , the ideal cryptographic library is a system Sys cry,id n,L that consists of several structures ({TH H }, S H ), one for each value of the parameter H. Each structure consists of a set of machines, here only containing the single machine TH H , and a set S H := {in u ?, out u ! | u ∈ H} denoting those ports of TH H that the honest users connect to. Formally, we obtain Sys cry,id n,L := {({TH H }, S H ) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}. In the following, we omit the parameters n and L for simplicity.
3
The main data structure of TH H is a database D. The entries of D are abstract representations of the data produced during a system run, together with the information on who knows these data. Each entry in D is of the form (recall the notation in Section 2.1) (ind , type, arg, hnd u 1 , . . . , hnd um , hnd a , len)
where H = {u 1 , . . . , u m }. For each entry x ∈ D:
• x.ind ∈ IN DS, called index, consecutively numbers all entries in D. The set IN DS is isomorphic to N and is used to distinguish index arguments from others. The index is used as a primary key attribute of the database, i.e., we write
• x.type ∈ typeset identifies the type of x.
• x.arg = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j ) is a possibly empty list of arguments. Many values a i are indices of other entries in D and thus in IN DS. We sometimes distinguish them by a superscript "ind".
• x.hnd u ∈ HN DS ∪ {↓} for u ∈ H ∪ {a} are handles by which a user or adversary u knows
Capturing Distributed Keys in the Abstract Library
In order to capture that keys shared between users and the trusted third party have already been generated and distributed, we assume that suitable entries for the keys already exist in the database. We denote the handle of u to the secret key shared with v, where either u ∈ {1, . . . , n} and v = T or vice versa, as skse hnd u,v . More formally, we start with an initially empty database D, and for each user u ∈ H two entries of the following form are added (the first one being a public-key identifier for the actual secret key as described below in more detail):
(ind := pkse u , type := pkse, arg := (), len := 0); (ind := skse u , type := skse, arg := (ind − 1),
Here pkse u and skse u are two consecutive natural numbers; treating public-key identifiers as being of length 0 is a technicality in the proof of [8] , and skse len * (k) denotes the abstract length of the secret key. These lengths will not matter in the following.
The first entry has to be incorporated in order to reflect special capabilities that the adversary may have with respect to symmetric encryption schemes in the real world. For instance it must be possible for an adversary against the ideal library to check whether encryptions have been created with the same secret key since the definition of symmetric encryption schemes does not exclude this and it can hence happen in the real system. For public-key encryption, this was achieved in [10] by tagging ciphertexts with the corresponding public key so that the public keys can be compared. For symmetric encryption, this is not possible as no public key exists, hence this problem is solved by tagging abstract ciphertexts with an otherwise meaningless "public key" solely used as an identifier for the secret key. Note that the argument of a secret key points to its key identifier. In the following, public-key identifiers will not matter any further.
We omit the details of how these entries for user u are added by a command gen symenc key, followed by a command send s for sending the secret key over a secure channel.
The Otway-Rees Protocol Using the Abstract Library
We now model the Otway-Rees protocol in the framework of [42] and using the ideal cryptographic library.
For each user u ∈ {1, . . . , n} we define a machine M OR u , called a protocol machine, which executes the protocol sketched above for participant identity u. It is connected to its user via ports KS out u !, KS in u ? ("KS" for "Key Sharing") and to the cryptographic library via ports in u !, out u ?. We further model the trusted third party as a machine M OR T . It does not connect to any users and is connected to the cryptographic library via ports in T !, out T ?. The combination of the protocol machines M OR u , the trusted third party M OR T , and the trusted host TH H is the ideal Otway-Rees system Sys OR,id . It is shown in Figure 1 ; H and A model the arbitrary joint honest users and the adversary, respectively.
Using the notation of [10] , we have Sys
. . , n}}, cf. the definition of the ideal cryptographic library in Section 2.3, whereM H := {TH H }∪{M OR u | u ∈ H∪{T}} and S H := {KS in u ?, KS out u ! | u ∈ H}, i.e., for a given set H of honest users, only the protocol machines M OR u with u ∈ H are actually present in a protocol run. The others are subsumed in the adversary.
The state of the protocol machine M OR u consists of the bitstring u and a set Nonce u of pairs of the form (n hnd , m hnd , v, j), where n hnd , m hnd are handles, v ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Intuitively, a pair (n hnd , m hnd , v, j) states that M OR u generated the handle n hnd in the j-th step of the protocol in a session run with v and session identifier m hnd . The set Nonce u is initially empty. The trusted third party M OR T maintains an initially empty set SID T to store already processed session IDs.
We now define how the protocol machine M OR u evaluates inputs. They either come from user u at port KS in u ? or from TH H at port out u ?. The behavior of M OR u in both cases is described 8
Algorithm 1 Evaluation of Inputs from the User (Protocol Start)
Input: (new prot, Otway Rees, v) at KS in u ? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}.
in Algorithm 1 and 3 respectively, which we will describe below. The trusted third party M OR T only receives inputs from the cryptographic library, and its behavior is described in Algorithm 2. We refer to Step i of Algorithm j as Step j.i. All three algorithms should immediately abort if a command to the cryptographic library does not yield the desired result, e.g., if a decryption requests fails. For readability we omit these abort checks in the algorithm descriptions; instead we impose the following convention on all three algorithms. 
Protocol start.
The user of the protocol machine M OR u can start a new protocol with user v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u} by inputting (new prot, Otway Rees, v) at port KS in u ?. Our security proof holds for all adversaries and all honest users, i.e., especially those that start protocols with the adversary (respectively a malicious user) in parallel with protocols with honest users. Upon such an input, M OR u builds up the term corresponding to the first protocol message using the ideal cryptographic library according to Algorithm 1. The command gen nonce generates the ideal nonce as well as the session identifier. M OR u stores the resulting handles n hnd u and m hnd in Nonce u for future comparison together with the identity of v and an indicator that these handles were generated in the first step of the protocol. The command store inputs arbitrary application data into the cryptographic library, here the user identities u and v. The command list forms a list and sym encrypt is symmetric encryption. The final command send i means that M OR u sends the resulting term to v over an insecure channel. The effect is that the adversary obtains a handle to the term and can decide what to do with it (such as forwarding it to M OR v ).
Evaluation of network inputs for protocol machines.
The behavior of the protocol machine M OR u upon receiving an input from the cryptographic library at port out u ? (corresponding to a message that arrives over the network) is defined similarly in Algorithm 3. By construction of TH H , such an input is always of the form (v, u, i, m hnd ) where m hnd is a handle to a list. To increase readability, and to clarify the connection between the 
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hnd ). {l (2) hnd ≈ {N u , M, u, v}}
14:
Abort 18: end if 19: skse hnd ← gen symenc key().
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algorithmic description and the usual protocol notation, we augment the algorithm with explanatory comments at its right-hand side to depict which handle corresponds to which Dolev-Yao term. We further use the naming convention that ingoing and outgoing messages are labeled m, where outgoing messages have an additional subscript corresponding to the protocol step. Encryptions are labeled c, the encrypted lists are labeled l, both with suitable sub-and superscripts.
M OR u first determines the session identifier and aborts if it is not of type nonce. M OR u then checks if the obtained message could correspond to the first, third, or fourth step of the protocol. (Recall that the second step is only performed by T.) This is implemented by looking up the session identifier in the set Nonce u . After that, M OR u checks if the obtained message is indeed a suitably constructed message for the particular step and the particular session ID by exploiting the contents of Nonce u . If so, M OR u constructs a message according to the protocol description, sends it to the intended recipient, updates the set Nonce u , and possibly signals to its user that a key has been successfully shared with another user. 
Algorithm 3 Evaluation of Inputs from
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On Polynomial Runtime
In order to use existing composition results of the underlying model, the protocol machines M OR w and M OR T must be polynomial-time. Similar to the cryptographic library, we define that each of these machines maintains explicit polynomial bounds on the message lengths and the number of inputs accepted at each port.
The Security Property
In the following, we formalize the security property of the ideal and real Otway-Rees protocols. The property consists of a key secrecy property and a consistency property. We first formalize the ideal key secrecy property which is an instantiation of a general key secrecy definition for arbitrary protocols based on the ideal cryptographic library. It was introduced in [9] and is symbolic, based on the typical notion that a term is not an element of the adversary's knowledge set. In the given Dolev-Yao-style library, the adversary's knowledge set is the set of all terms to which the adversary has a handle. After that we introduce the notion of cryptographic, real-or-random key secrecy based on the real cryptographic library. Finally, we express the consistency property, and we distinguish perfect and computational fulfillment of the property.
Definition of the Key Secrecy Property
The first step towards defining symbolic key secrecy is to consider one state of the ideal DolevYao-style library and to define that a handle points to a symmetric key, that the key is symbolically unknown to the adversary, and that it has not been used for encryption. These are the symbolic conditions under which we can hope to prove that the corresponding real key is indistinguishable from a fresh random key for the adversary. Note that the operations that the Otway-Rees protocol performs on new keys are allowed in this sense. For Condition (3) in the definition, note that the arguments of a ciphertext term are (l, pk ) where l is the plaintext index and pk the index of the public tag of the secret key, with pk = sk − 1 for the secret key index. (4) is a symbolically secret key iff it has the three previous properties.
A secret-key belief function is a general way to designate the keys whose secrecy should be proved. The underlying theory from [9] is based on such functions. We instantiate them for the Otway-Rees protocol and thus essentially for all individual key exchange protocols. A secret key belief function maps the user view to a set of triples (u, l hnd , t) of a user, a handle, and a type, pointing to the supposedly secret keys. For the Otway-Rees protocol, we define secret-key belief functions seckeys initiator OR for the initiator and seckeys responder OR for the responder that designate the exchanged keys. 
We now define symbolic key secrecy for such a function. In addition to the conditions for individual keys, we require that all elements point to different terms, so that we can expect the corresponding list of cryptographic keys to be entirely random. and a secret-key belief function seckeys for H be given. Let gen SE denote the key generation algorithm. This configuration keeps the keys in seckeys cryptographically secret iff for all probabilistic-polynomial time algorithms Dis (the distinguisher), we have
where NEGL denotes the negligible function of the security parameter k and the used random variables are defined as follows: For r ∈ run conf , let va := view conf (A)(r) be the view of the adversary, let (u i , l hnd i , t i ) i=1,...,n := seckeys(view conf (H)(r)) be the user-handle-type triples of presumably secret keys, and let the keys be keys real := (sk i ) i=1,...,n with and keys fresh := (sk
..,n with sk 
Definition of the Consistency Property
The consistency property states that if two honest users establish a session key then both need to have a consistent view of who the peers to the session are, i.e., if an honest user u establishes a key with v, and v establishes the same key with another user w, then u has to equal w. Moreover, we incorporate the correctness of the protocol into the consistency property, i.e., if the aforementioned outputs occur and u = w holds, then both parties have obtained the same key. 5 In the following definitions, we write t : D to denote the contents of database D at time t, and t : p?m and t : p!m to denote that message m occurs at input port respectively output port p at time t.
The consistency property Req Cons is formally captured as follows: Assume that outputs (ok initiator, Otway Rees, v, ID Cons is given in Figure 2 .
Note that the consistency property Req Cons specifically relies on the state of TH H , hence it cannot be used as is to capture the security of the real Otway-Rees system, where TH H is replaced with the secure implementation of the cryptographic library. The corresponding consistency property Req Cons real for the real Otway-Rees system can be defined by requiring that both handles point to the same bitstring, i.e., by replacing t 1 : D[hnd u = skse The notion of a system Sys fulfilling such a property Req essentially comes in two flavors [6] .
Perfect fulfillment, Sys |= perf Req, means that the property holds with probability one (over the probability spaces of runs, a well-defined notion from the underlying model [42] ) for all honest users and for all adversaries. Computational fulfillment, Sys |= poly Req, means that the property only holds for polynomially bounded users and adversaries, and only with negligible error probability. Perfect fulfillment implies computational fulfillment.
The following theorem captures the security of the Otway-Rees protocol.
Theorem 4.5 (Security of the Otway-Rees Protocol) Let Sys
OR,id and Sys OR,real be the ideal and real Otway-Rees system, respectively, as defined in Section 3.2. Then we have:
• Secrecy: Sys OR,id keeps the exchanged keys of honest users strictly symbolically secret, and all polynomial-time configurations of Sys OR,real keep the exchanged keys of honest users cryptographically secret.
• 
Proof in the Ideal Setting
This section contains the proof of the ideal part of Theorem 4.5, i.e., the proof of the Otway-Rees protocol using the ideal, deterministic cryptographic library. The proof idea is the following: If an honest user u successfully terminates a session run with another honest user v, then we first show that the established key has been created before by the trusted third party. After that, we exploit that the trusted third party as well as all honest users may only send this key within an encryption generated with a key shared between u and T respectively v and T, and we conclude that the adversary hence never gets a handle to the key. The main challenge was to find suitable invariants on the state of the ideal Otway-Rees system. This is somewhat similar to formal proofs using the Dolev-Yao model, and the similarity supports our hope that the new, sound cryptographic library can be used in the place of the Dolev-Yao models in automated tools. The proof of the invariants is postponed to Appendix A.
Invariants
The first invariants, correct nonce owner and unique nonce use, are easily proved and essentially state that handles x hnd where (x hnd , ·, ·, ·) is contained in a set Nonce u indeed point to entries of type nonce, and that no nonce is in two such sets. The next two invariants, nonce secrecy and nonce-list secrecy, deal with the secrecy of certain terms. They are mainly needed to prove the invariant correct list generation, which establishes who created certain terms. The last invariant, key secrecy, states that the adversary never learns keys created by the trusted third party for use between honest users.
• Correct Nonce Owner. For all u ∈ H, and for all (x hnd , ·, ·, ·) ∈ Nonce u , it holds D[hnd u = x hnd ] = ↓ and D[hnd u = x hnd ].type = nonce.
• Unique Nonce Use. For all u, v ∈ H, all w, w ′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and all j ≤ size:
Nonce secrecy states that the nonces exchanged between honest users u and v remain secret from all other users and from the adversary. For the formalization, note that the handles x hnd to these nonces are contained as elements (x hnd , ·, v, ·) in the set Nonce u . The claim is that the other users and the adversary have no handles to such a nonce in the database D of TH H :
• Nonce Secrecy. For all u, v ∈ H and for all j ≤ size:
.hnd w = ↓ implies w ∈ {u, v, T}. In particular, this means D[j].hnd a = ↓.
Similarly, the invariant nonce-list secrecy states that a list containing such a handle can only be known to u, v, and T. Further, it states that the identity fields in such lists are correct. Moreover, if such a list is an argument of another entry, then this entry is an encryption created with the secret key that either u or v share with T. (Formally this means that this entry is tagged with the corresponding public-key identifier as an abstract argument, cf. Section 3.1.)
• Nonce-List Secrecy. The invariant correct list owner states that certain protocol messages can only be constructed by the "intended" users respectively by the trusted third party.
• Finally, the invariant key secrecy states that a secret key entry that has been generated by the trusted third party to be shared between honest users u and v can only be known to u, v, and T. In particular, the adversary will never get a handle to it. This invariant is key for proving the secrecy and the consistency property of the Otway-Rees protocol.
• Key Secrecy. 
Real-or-random Key Secrecy of the Otway-Rees Protocol via a Symbolic Security Proof
The proof is postponed to Appendix A.
Proof of the Ideal Part of Theorem 4.5
For the proof of the ideal part of Theorem 4.5, the following property of TH H proven in [10] will be useful.
Lemma 5.2 The ideal cryptographic library Sys
cry,id has the following property: The only modifications to existing entries x in D are assignments to previously undefined attributes x.hnd u (except for counter updates in entries for signature keys, which we do not have to consider here), and appending new elements to the list of arguments of symmetric encryptions. 
and (y (1) and (2) respectively Equations (4) and (5) T ) at out T ? at a time t 1 < t 2 with w ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We conclude l As the condition of Step 2.7 is false immediately afterwards, we obtain y 
Step 2.7 further ensures y 2 3 ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {w} and y 2 4 = w. As above, we conclude l 
Step 2.16 furthermore ensures x (1) and (3) imply
ind ].type = skse at time t 2 (9) respectively Equations (4) and (6) imply
ind ].type = skse at time t 2 .
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We are now ready to show symbolic secrecy of the exchanged keys, i.e., to derive that the terms selected by seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR are symbolically unused symmetric keys that have furthermore not been used for encryption yet. . Consider the first time that an element containing w as its third component was entered into Nonce v . This could either happen in Step 1.3 or in Step 3.9. In both cases however, we obtain w ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {v} by definition of Algorithm 1 and 3, hence we have u = w as desired.
To conclude the proof, we have to consider those cases where w does not get a handle to D[hnd v = skse 
Proof of the Cryptographic Realization
If Theorem 4.5 has been proven, it remains to show that the Otway-Rees protocol based on the real cryptographic library computationally fulfills corresponding secrecy and consistency requirements. Obviously, carrying over properties from the ideal to the real system crucially relies on the fact that the real cryptographic library is at least as secure as the ideal one. As briefly sketched in the introduction, this has been established in [10, 8] , but only subject to the side condition that the surrounding protocol, i.e., the Otway-Rees protocol in our case, does not raise a so-called commitment problem. Establishing this side condition is crucial for using symmetric encryption in abstract, cryptographically sound proofs. We explain the commitment problem in detail in the next section to illustrate the cryptographic issue underlying the commitment problem, and we exploit the invariants of Section 5 to show that the commitment problem does not occur for the Otway-Rees protocol. As our proof is the first Dolev-Yao-style, computationally sound proof of a protocol that uses symmetric encryption, our result also shows that the commitment problem, and hence also symmetric encryption, can be conveniently dealt with in cryptographically sound proofs of security by means of the approach of [8] .
For technical reasons, one further has to ensure that the surrounding protocol does not create "encryption cycles" (such as encrypting a key with itself), which had to be required even for acquiring properties weaker than simulatability, cf. [3] for further discussions. This property is only a technical subtlety and clearly holds for the Otway-Rees protocol.
Absence of the Commitment Problem for the Otway-Rees Protocol
As the name suggests, a "commitment problem" in simulatability proofs captures a situation where the simulator commits itself to a certain message and later has to change this commitment to allow for a correct simulation. In the case of symmetric encryption, the commitment problem occurs if the simulator learns in some abstract way that a ciphertext was sent and hence has to construct an indistinguishable ciphertext, knowing neither the secret key nor the plaintext used for the corresponding ciphertext in the real world. To simulate the missing key, the simulator will create a new secret key, or rely on an arbitrary, fixed key if the encryption systems guarantees indistinguishable keys, see [3] . Instead of the unknown plaintext, the simulator will encrypt an arbitrary message of the correct length, relying on the indistinguishability of ciphertexts of different messages. So far, the simulation is fine. It even stays fine if the message becomes known later because secure encryption still guarantees that it is indistinguishable that the simulator's ciphertext contains a wrong message. However, if the secret key becomes known later, the simulator runs into trouble, because, learning abstractly about this fact, it has to produce a suitable key that decrypts its ciphertext into the correct message. It cannot cheat with the message because it has to produce the correct behavior towards the honest users. This is typically not possible.
The solution for this problem taken in [8] for the cryptographic library is to leave it to the surrounding protocol to guarantee that the commitment problem does not occur, i.e., the surrounding protocol must guarantee that keys are no longer sent in a form that might make them known to the adversary once an honest participant has started using them. To exploit the simulatability results of [8] , we hence have to prove this condition for the Otway-Rees protocol. Formally, we have to show that the following property NoComm does not occur: "If there exists an input from an honest user that causes a symmetric encryption to be generated such that the corresponding key is not known to the adversary, then future inputs may only cause this key to be sent within an encryption that cannot be decrypted by the adversary". This event can be rigorously defined in the style of the secrecy and consistency property but we omit the rigorous definition due to space constraints and refer to [8] . The event NoComm is equivalent to the event "if there exists an input from an honest user that causes a symmetric encryption to be generated such that the corresponding key is not known to the adversary, the adversary never gets a handle to this key" but NoComm has the advantage that it can easily be inferred from the abstract protocol description without presupposing knowledge about handles of the cryptographic library. For the Otway-Rees protocol the event NoComm can easily be verified by inspection of the abstract protocol description, and a detailed proof based on Algorithms 1-3 can also easily be performed by exploiting the invariants of Section 5. Proof. Note first that the secret key shared initially between a user and the trusted third party will never be sent by definition in case the user is honest, and it is already known to the adversary when it is first used in case of a dishonest user. The interesting cases are thus the keys generated by the trusted third party in the protocol sessions. .hnd a = ↓ for all t ∈ N, which finishes the proof. 2
Proof of Real-or-random Secrecy and Computational Consistency
As the final step in the overall security proof, we show how to derive corresponding secrecy and consistency properties from the proofs in the ideal setting and the simulatability result of the underlying library. In particular, we derive cryptographic, real-or-random key secrecy as well as computational fulfillment of the consistency property.
Once we have shown that the considered keys are symbolically secret and that the commitment problem does not occur for the Otway-Rees protocol, we can exploit the following key-secrecy preservation theorem: Theorem 6.2 (Symbolic Key Secrecy Implies Cryptographic Key Secrecy [9] ) Let a polynomialtime honest user H of a structure ({TH H }, S H ) of the ideal cryptographic library and a secretkey belief function seckeys for H be given such that the cryptographic library with this user keeps the keys in seckeys strictly symbolically secret. Then every polynomial-time configuration (M H , S H , H, A) of the real cryptographic library (with the same user H) keeps the keys in seckeys cryptographically secret.
It is easy to show that this theorem implies the cryptographic secrecy part of Theorem 4.5 once the ideal, symbolic part has already been shown: We have shown in Section 5 that the ideal Otway-Rees protocol keeps the keys of honest users strictly symbolically secret, i.e., the cryptographic library with user H * denoting the combination of {H} ∪ {M OR u | u ∈ H} keeps the keys in seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR strictly symbolically secret. Hence Theorem 6.2 implies that every polynomial-time configuration (M H , S H , H * , A) of the real cryptographic library keeps the keys in seckeys initiator OR and seckeys responder OR cryptographically secret, and thus that the every polynomial-time configurations of Sys OR,real keeps the exchanged keys of honest users cryptographically secret.
We only briefly sketch how to derive Req Cons real from the the ideal counterpart since the proofs contains requires slightly more knowledge about the underlying proof of soundness of the cryptographic library [10, 8] : One first exploits that the real and ideal consistency properties closely resemble so-called integrity properties in the sense of [6] . Integrity properties correspond to sets of traces at the in-and output ports connecting the system to the honest users, i.e., properties that can be expressed solely via statements about events at the port set S H ; in particular, integrity property hence do not rely on the state of the underlying machine. Integrity properties are preserved under simulatability, i.e., they carry over from the ideal to the real system without any additional work. Formally, the following preservation theorem has been established in [6] . 
Conclusion
We have proven the Otway-Rees protocol in the real cryptographic setting via a deterministic, provably secure abstraction of a real cryptographic library. Together with composition and preservation theorems from the underlying model, this library allowed us to perform the actual proof effort in a deterministic setting corresponding to a slightly extended Dolev-Yao model. In particular, we prove real-or-random secrecy of the exchanged keys, i.e., no polynomial-time adversary attacking the protocol is able to distinguish fresh, random keys and keys that are actually exchanged in the protocol. Besides establishing the cryptographic security of the Otway-Rees protocol, our result also serves an an exemplification of the potential of the cryptographic library and the recent secrecy preservation theorem for symbolic, automated, and cryptographically sound proofs of security protocols. We now only have to show that the entry D[j] has been created by u in the claimed steps. This can easily be seen by inspection of Algorithms 1, 2, and 3. We only show it in detail for the first part of the invariant; it can be proven similarly for the second part where the claim about the session identifier immediately follows from the proof.
Let (x .hnd u has been generated by TH H at time t since the command gen nonce was input at in u ? at time t. The definition of gen nonce immediately implies that D[j].hnd w = ↓ at time t if w = u. Moreover, this also holds at time t + 1 since a transition of M OR u does not modify handles in TH H , which finishes the claim for this case.
For proving the second case, we only have to consider those commands that add handles for w to entries of type nonce. These are only the commands list proj or adv parse input at in w ?,
